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Shortly before the proposed Balanced Budget Amendment 
went down to defeat by a single vote in March 1995,1 Kansas 
Senator Nancy Kassebaum explained her reason for dropping 
her previous opposition to that much-debated but still-undeliv-
ered change in the United States Constitution.2 It wasn't that the 
Senator had overcome her doubts about the ability of the Bal-
anced Budget Amendment actually to curb the evils of an ever-
increasing deficit. No, the reason was more subtle: "It may be 
like the Prohibition Amendment," she explained. "We may just 
have to get it out of our system." It was true that "(p]rohibition 
didn't stop drinking," but then it didn't really wreck, or even per-
manently mar, the Constitution eithe£.3 After all, we repealed 
the Eighteenth Amendment when we ratified the 1\venty-first, a 
little over a decade later. 
The Eighteenth Amendment, it should be said, is nearly eve-
rybody's prime example of a constitutionally dumb idea. Dean 
John Hart Ely, for instance, uses it as Exhibit A in his case 
against constitutionalizing social or economic policies.4 To my 
knowledge, however, few people have focused on how silly the 
Prohibition Repeal Amendment-the 1\venty-First-was. Not 
that the idea it represented was silly. It wasn't. What could be 
sounder then getting rid of the Prohibition Amendment? The 
problem wasn't the idea, but its implementation. 
• Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard University. 
1. Senate Rejects Amendment on Balancing the Budget, N.Y. Times at A1 (March 3, 
1995) (vote of 66-34, which became 65-35 when Majority Leader Robert Dole switched 
his vote so that he could bring up the measure again at any time). 
2. Alan McConagha, Inside Politics, Washington Times, at 5 (Jan. 17, 1995). 
3. Id. 
4. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: a Theory of Judicial Review 99-100 
(Harvard U. Press, 1980). 
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Before getting to the punchline-all right, what was so 
dumb about the way the 1\venty-First Amendment went about 
repealing the Eighteenth?-let me say why the point seems 
worth pursuing. Lots of ideas make constitutional sense in the 
abstract. Protecting future generations from our own short-
sighted proclivities to heap on a mountain of debt through a sort 
of taxation without representation-that's actually a pretty good 
idea.s But between the rhetoric and the reality, as they say, falls 
the shadow. Otherwise put, in constitutional matters, as in 
others, the devil is in the details. So one must look closely at the 
details before signing on to the whole package. 
Consider, then, the details of the 1\venty-First Amendment. 
Its opening section (Section 1) repealed the Eighteenth Amend-
ment. So far so good. Its closing section (Section 3) set a seven-
year time limit on ratification. Again, a fine idea. In fact, the 
practice of setting such limits in advance actually dated back to 
the Eighteenth Amendment (before whose advent Congress had 
neglected to set any time limits at all, leading to such peculiar 
episodes as the ratification of the 1\venty-Seventh Amendment 
over two centuries after its proposal to the States6). But consider 
Section 2, the inside of this constitutional sandwich. Here's the 
relevant baloney: 
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or 
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of 
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby 
prohibited. 7 
Now there's one for the books! Notice that this language 
doesn't merely empower the States, notwithstanding the inhibi-
tions of the Dormant Commerce Clause,s to bar transporting or 
importing intoxicants for local delivery or consumption. That 
was its evident objective.9 In fact, reading the Supreme Court's 
5. Constitutional Amendment to Balance the Budget: Hearings on S.J. Res. 9, SJ. 
Res. 18, S.J. 182, and Related Proposals Before the Senate Committee on the Budget, 
102d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (June 4, 1992) (testimony of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe). 
6. Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported 1Wenty-
Seventh Amendment, 11 Const. Comm. 101, 102-07 (1994). 
7. U.S. Const. Amendment XXI,§ 2. 
8. The Constitution does not explicitly limit the States' ability to regulate matters 
affecting interstate commerce; rather, the requirement that state laws not discriminate 
against or unduly burden interstate commerce ftows from the "negative implications" of 
the affirmative grant to Congress of power over this subject area in Article I, § 8. Lau-
rence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 6-1 to 6-14 (Foundation Press, 2d 
ed.1988) (explaining the doctrine). 
9. See, e.g., South Dakotll v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,218 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) ("history of Amendment" supports view that it was intended to restore absolute state 
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decisions purporting to describe the 1\venty-Hrst Amendment,to 
one would get the distinct impression that it was rather ordi-
nary-just a constitutional embodiment of the proposition that, 
provided the States not use their control over beer, wine, and 
spirits to violate unrelated constitutional provisions, they are free 
to erect barriers to the influx of alcohol notwithstanding the prin-
ciples of federalism that would normally tell the States that they 
must sink or swim together.tt 
Now this wasn't the first time an amendment's text missed 
its mark.12 But this miss is a doozy. The text actually forbids the 
private conduct it identifies, rather than conferring power on the 
States as such. This has the singular effect of putting the 1\venty-
Hrst Amendment on a pedestal most observers have always as-
sumed was reserved for the rather more august Thirteenth 
Amendment, which is typically described as the only exception to 
the principle that our Constitution's provisions, even when they 
don't say so expressly,t3 limit only some appropriate level of 
government. 
To repeat, Section 2 of the 1\venty-first Amendment directly 
prohibits-talk about prohibition!!-the conduct that it was ap-
parently meant to authorize the States to prohibit, freeing them 
of some (but not all) otherwise applicable limits derived from the 
rest of the Constitution. As a result, not only does the Amend-
ment do more than its purpose required, it also does less. That is, 
it fails to specify that the States are authorized by it to do any-
thing at all; that conclusion is evidently thought to follow by 
some sort of logical necessity. And just what it is they are au-
control over liquor and that "the Federal Government could not use its Commerce Clause 
powers to interfere in any manner with the States' exercise [of this power]") (internal 
quotations omitted); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 349 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting) (Amendment gave state "virtually complete control" over liquor importation 
and distribution, a "special power" that "primarily created an exception to the normal 
operation of the Commerce Qause") (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
10. See, e.g., Bacchus Impons, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275 (1984); Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 
331-32 (1964). 
11. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). 
12. Take the Eleventh Amendment, for example. Read literally, it says nothing to 
limit federal jurisdiction over suits against a State by the State's own citizens, the typical 
context in which the amendment is invoked. Moreover, a powerful argument can be 
made that its text was intended only to restrict party identity as a basis for federal court 
jurisdiction. Tribe, American Constitutional Law§ 3-25, at 175 n.8 (cited in note 8) (col-
lecting commentary). To give sovereign immunity some life, however, the Supreme Court 
has basically ignored the Amendment's language and construed the Amendment as em-
bodying or exemplifying the concept of state sovereign immunity. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 
U.S. 1 (1890); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (II), 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) 
(construing Hans). 
13. See, e.g., U.S. Const. Amends. II, III, V. 
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thorized to do-to prohibit importation of liquor, yes; to use 
their liquor authority to distort the national liquor market, 
not4-is left largely to the constitutional imagination. Moreover, 
the two statutes enforcing the 1\venty-Frrst Amendmentts neces-
sarily rest for their underlying authorityt6 not on anything added 
to the Constitution by the 1\venty-first Amendmentt7 but on the 
good old Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8. 
The upshot is that there are two ways, and two ways only, in 
which an ordinary private citizen, acting under her own steam 
and under color of no law, can violate the United States Consti-
tution. One is to enslave somebody, a suitably hellish act. The 
other is to bring a bottle of beer, wine, or bourbon into a State in 
violation of its beverage control laws-an act that might have 
been thought juvenile, and perhaps even lawless, but 
unconstitutional? 
The moral of my story is simple. Senator Kassebaum, if you 
are listening, before voting for any amendment on the premise 
that we can always repeal it later, make sure you've got your exit 
strategy-and, come to think of it, your entry strategy-mapped 
out in some detail. The Constitution may not be ruined by re-
peated hit-and-run attacks of the sort that Prohibition and its re-
peal entailed, but it might not emerge intact either. The cost-
benefit calculus of each new adventure in constitutional tinkering 
had better include honest attention first to the details of what 
sort of enforcement the effort will entailts and, failing effective 
14. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337, 341-42 (1989); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. 
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 274-76 (1984). 
15. The first, the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, was adopted to "enforce the 
Twenty-first Amendment" by imposing licensing requirements on liquor distributors, as 
well as penalties for violating these requirements. 49 Stat. 978, ch. 814, § 3-4 (1935) (cur-
rently codified at 27 U.S.C. §§ 203-04 (1994)). The second imposes criminal penalties for 
violations of state liquor importation and distribution laws. See 62 Stat. 761, ch. 645, § 1 
(1948) (currently codified, as amended, at 18 U.S.C. § 1262 (1994)). 
16. See U.S. Const. Amend. X (requiring such authority). 
17. A draft version of the Twenty-first Amendment had actually included an addi-
tional clause providing that "Congress shall have concurrent authority to regulate or pro-
hibit the sale of intoxicating liquors to be drunk on the premises where sold." S.J. Res. 
211, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., 76 Cong. Rec. 4138, 4139 (1933). Despite certain judicial state-
ments to the contrary, see Arrow Distilleries, Inc. v. Alexander, 109 F.2d 397,401 (7th Cir. 
1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 646 (1940), in its final version the Amendment included 
nothing that could possibly serve as any source of authority for Congress to enact enforc-
ing legislation. 
18. For example, by stripping the federal courts of their power to hear any case or 
controversy arising under the Balanced Budget Amendment, the Nunn Amendment al-
most enabled the former amendment to pass, despite its rather strange (and dangerous) 
consequence for the balance of powers: the President would have been its sole enforcer, 
without fear of judicial intervention. Tony Mauro, Nunn's Provision May Have KiUed 
Amendmenr's Muscle, Experts Say, USA Today, at 4 (Mar. 1, 1995) (quoting L. Tribe). 
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enforcement, what glide path we can follow for leaving the new 
toy behind, if not for making it fly. In particular, when an 
amendment is proposed that conspicuously lacks any effective 
means of enforcement-as both Prohibition and the Balanced 
Budget Amendment did-think hard, before embarking on the 
flight, about how you plan to land. How, precisely, can the Na-
tion gracefully shut down those constitutional experiments that 
fizzle? And, perhaps a trickier matter, how can it safely unplug 
those that threaten to blow up the lab altogether? 
